We investigate unconditional security for message authentication protocols that are designed using two-channel cryptography. We look at both noninteractive message authentication protocols (NIMAPs) and interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs). We provide a new proof of nonexistence of nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. This proof consists of a combinatorial counting argument and is much shorter than the previous proof by Wang et al., which was based on probability distribution arguments. Further, we propose a generalization of an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to Naor, Segev and Smith. With a careful choice of parameters, our scheme improves that of Naor et al. Our scheme is very close to optimal for most parameter situations of practical interest.
Introduction
In this paper, we focus on using two-channel cryptography to design unconditionally secure message authentication protocols suitable for networks consisting of devices with limited resources. In particular, we look at noninteractive message authentication protocols (NIMAPs) and interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs). Previous protocols and proofs are reviewed and some are improved.
Standard models of public-key cryptography and secret-key cryptography have addressed the problem of message authentication by means of assuming availability of public-key infrastructures or secure channels. In some scenarios, however, assuming the traditional settings of public-key and secret-key cryptography might not be practical and, indeed, using these techniques may be very costly. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), wireless sensor networks (WSN), and pervasive networks in general are examples of scenarios in which traditional cryptographic protocols may not be suitable, or not even possible, to implement.
In search of a solution to this problem, researchers realized that when the devices come in close geographic proximity of each other, it is possible to make use of a manual channel, as well as the usual wireless channel. Instances of the manual channel are typically more expensive to operate compared to the wireless channel. However, they provide some level of security. For example, the channel may provide authenticity of short messages, but may not be confidential. The aim is to employ a (broadband and insecure) wireless channel and a (somewhat secure and narrowband) manual channel at the same time and attain a security objective, message authentication for instance. This motivated the term two-channel cryptography. In 1984, Rivest and Shamir [18] first proposed incorporating human participation in authentication protocols. However, this idea did not receive serious attention from researchers until very recently.
Communication Model of Two-channel Cryptography
We first describe the communication model of two-channel cryptography, where it is assumed that two channels are accessible for communication: an insecure broadband channel, denoted by "→", and an authenticated narrow-band channel, denoted by "⇒". Communication over the authenticated channel is usually more expensive and less convenient. Hence, the messages sent over the authenticated channel are usually much shorter than those sent over the insecure channel. The goal of two-channel cryptography is, then, to achieve a certain cryptographic objective by means of the two channels, while optimizing the cost.
An insecure wireless channel is an example of the broadband channel. The narrow-band channel is usually used to send a short string. Instances of the narrow-band channel include voice-overinternet-protocol (VoIP), data imprinting or data comparison by a user, near field communication (NFC), infrared (IR), laser, or visible light between two devices.
The following are common assumptions on what an adversary can and cannot do in two-channel cryptography.
• The adversary has full control over the broadband channel. That is, the adversary can listen to any messages sent over the broadband channel, modify the messages sent via this channel, stall a message from being delivered, and insert a new message into this channel at any time.
• On the other hand, we assume that the adversary's control over the authenticated channel is limited. In particular, the adversary cannot modify the information transmitted over the authenticated channel, i.e., data integrity is ensured in this channel. However, it may be possible to read, delay or remove a message from this channel.
Moreover, the authenticated channel is equipped with user authenticating features such that the recipient of the information can be sure about who sent it. In other words, an adversary cannot initiate a flow over this channel. On the other hand, the adversary is able to replay a previous flow sent through this channel. However, replaying a previous flow sent by Alice to Bob is not going to help Eve, when she wants to deceive another party, Charlie. That is, when Bob receives an authenticated flow, he can check if he was the intended recipient or not.
Two-channel Cryptography Applications
Two-channel cryptography techniques have several applications, especially in constrained environments where secure channels or trusted infrastructures do not exist or are very costly to provide. Moreover, these techniques are useful in networks that are composed of constrained devices which cannot handle heavy computations such as public-key computations.
With new technological advancements in miniaturizing devices and the emerging smart homes and buildings projects [2] , the problem of designing light-weight cryptographic protocols for low-end devices has attracted a lot of attention both in the academic community and in industry. In scenarios such as personal area networks (PAN) [6] and telemedicine (remote health care where medical personnel can monitor the patients from a distance) [3] , where the devices are naturally attended by users, the idea of employing the manual channel is even more appealing. This approach is especially attractive when it enables researchers to design more cost-efficient and easy-to-implement protocols.
Another important application is disaster recovery, when a trusted infrastructure is compromised. The use of two-channel cryptography allows for temporary, yet speedy, relief before the infrastructure is fully recovered. Full recovery usually takes a lot longer and security providers need to be vigilant in the meantime.
Message Authentication in Ad hoc Networks
The problem of authentication is an important aspect of secure communication. Typically, communicating parties would like to be assured of the authenticity of information they obtain via potentially insecure channels.
An ad hoc network is a network where some of the users are part of the network only for a short period of time. For practical reasons, it should be possible to quickly add new users to an ad hoc network. In this network, like any other network, it is desirable to have message authentication. However, assuming traditional settings might not be practical. For example, a public-key infrastructure may not exist; secure channels might not be present; communication bandwidth may be severely limited. Consider the following scenario presented in the literature [1] which motives this setting: a traveller in an airport lounge would like to print a sensitive document from his or her laptop to one of the many printers set up in the airport lounge. The lounge does not have a secure universal naming infrastructure for the printers. The traveller wants to choose a particular printer and make sure the document gets printed by that particular printer (and no other printer), using the insecure wireless channel. The traveller's laptop and a printer need to be securely introduced while there is no public-key infrastructure or secure channel available.
In order to overcome these difficulties in an ad hoc network and still be able to provide message authentication, one can employ two-channel cryptographic techniques when designing protocols [1, 6, 5, 8, 11, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22 ].
Attack Model
We focus on message authentication protocols which deploy both narrow-band and broadband channels between a claimant Alice and a verifier Bob. Alice chooses a message M ∈ M, where M denotes the space of all acceptable messages, and sends it to Bob using a NIMAP or an IMAP. At the end of the protocol, Bob either outputs (Alice, M ′ ), where M ′ ∈ M, or he rejects. In the absence of an active adversary, denoted as Eve, the message M sent from Alice should be recovered by Bob, making him accept and output (Alice, M ). This message M could be a key that is going to be used for further communication. Eve's goal is to make Bob accept a message M ′ along with the identity of Alice, when Alice has never sent M ′ .
The attack model assumed in this context is the adaptive chosen plaintext attack (ACPA) model [7] . The ACPA model consists of two phases: an information gathering stage and a deception stage.
In the information gathering stage, Eve adaptively makes Alice send M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M q to Bob, where q is an integer termed the querying complexity. In the deception stage, Eve sends a single message M ′ , along with the identity of Alice, to Bob, where
Eve is successful if Bob accepts M ′ along with Alice's identity. The computational complexity of the adversary before the deception starts, i.e. during the information gathering stage, is referred to as offline computational complexity, whereas online computational complexity refers to the computational complexity of the adversary during the deception stage.
Interactive versus Noninteractive Protocols
A message authentication protocol may or may not require online interaction with Bob. There are numerous noninteractive as well as interactive message authentication protocols that have been considered in the literature [1, 6, 5, 8, 11, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22] .
In a NIMAP, all flows are initiated by Alice. She sends some information over the broadband channel and some information over the narrow-band channel. Since there is no flow being initiated by Bob, the order in which Alice's flows are sent is irrelevant. As a result, we can combine all flows sent over the broadband channel into one single flow and, similarly, we can combine all flows sent over the narrow-band channel into one single flow. Hence, without loss of generality, we obtain a typical flow structure of a NIMAP as depicted in Fig. 1 . On the other hand, the flow structure of an IMAP can be more complicated. There is at least one flow initiated by Bob and, hence, the order in which flows are initiated matters. There may be more than one narrow-band flow. The authenticated channel may be bidirectional which means Bob can initiate a flow over the narrow-band channel as well. Illustrated in Fig. 2 is a possible flow structure of an IMAP. In this particular flow structure, the first flow is initiated by Alice on the broadband channel which is followed by a response from Bob on the same channel. Then, Alice sends one more flow over the broadband channel and her authenticated flow over the narrow-band channel.
NIMAPs are particularly interesting because they do not require the verifier to be online. On the other hand, interaction sometimes allows for more efficient protocols. Furthermore, some objectives may not be achievable in the noninteractive setting, but can be realized in an interactive setting.
Computational versus Unconditional Security
In the unconditional security setting, the adversary is assumed to have unlimited computational resources. In the computational security setting, on the other hand, the computational power of the adversary is bounded (typically, it is assumed to be polynomial-time, as a function of a ...
Figure 2: A Sample Schematic IMAP certain security parameter). Moreover, the querying complexity of the adversary is also bounded in the computational security settings. In order for a protocol to be considered secure, the best currently-known methods to defeat a system or protocol should exceed the computational resources of the adversary by a comfortable margin. In case of computationally secure NIMAPs or IMAPs, a successful adversary is reduced (in the sense of a Turing reduction) to an attacker against a well-known system or problem which is proven, or widely believed, to be secure.
Contributions of this paper
We prove that nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist. Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] first proved this nonexistence result using probability distribution arguments. We prove the same result using a simple counting argument which is much shorter. Further, we propose a generalization of an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15] . With a careful choice of parameters, our scheme improves that of Naor et al. In fact, for most parameter situations of practical interest, our scheme requires an authenticated tag that is only 10 bits longer than the theoretical minimum proven in [14, 15] .
On Unconditionally Secure NIMAPs
In the study of unconditionally secure NIMAPs, we assume the existence of adversaries who have access to unbounded amounts of time and resources. In this section, we show that the only NIMAPs which are secure in the presence of such unbounded adversaries are trivial protocols. In other words, the entire message has to be sent over the authenticated channel in order for a NIMAP to be unconditionally secure. In other words, nontrivial NIMAPs that are unconditionally secure do not exist. This result was first proved by Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] using probability distribution arguments. We provide a new proof in the form of a simple counting argument.
Wang and Safavi-Naini's Proof
Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] first showed the impossibility of designing nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. They used the following model to describe the unconditionally secure NIMAP:
The information theoretic NIMAP model: The sender S (Alice) sends the message M and a value x over the insecure public channel, and a tag t over the manual channel. The receiver R (Bob) decides whether or not to accept M as authentic from S.
Wang and Safavi-Naini showed that unconditionally secure NIMAPs do not exist without prior shared secrets between the sender and receiver, and without requirements such as stall-free on the narrow-band channel 1 , unless the whole message is transmitted over the narrow-band channel. This results in a trivial protocol where the authenticated channel has enough bandwidth to transmit the whole message.
They suppose |M | > |t| and propose an attack. First, they show that there definitely exists some other message M ′ such that M ′ can be authenticated under some x ′ , possibly different from x, and the same tag t. Now, the adversary, on observing the authentication transcripts (M, x, t), replaces M and x with M ′ and x ′ .
They further note that the adversary can mount this attack online by removing M and x from the broadband channel and delaying t on the narrow-band channel until she finds an appropriate M ′ and x ′ . Then, she sends M ′ and x ′ over the broadband channel and let t be transmitted over the narrow-band channel right after.
In order to formally prove the effectiveness of their attack, for example when proving the existence of appropriate M ′ and x ′ , they use probability distribution arguments involving Shannon entropies.
A Simple Counting Argument
We now present a much shorter and simpler proof of nonexistence of nontrivial NIMAPs. Our proof is based on a counting argument.
We use the same model used by Wang and Safavi-Naini [22] and define M to be the set of all possible messages to be authenticated and R to be the set of all possible strings that could be sent on the first flow along with a possible message. Moreover, we let S be the set of all authenticating tags that are sent over the authenticated channel. An instance of a NIMAP in this model is as follows. A message M ∈ M is to be authenticated and it is sent over the broadband channel along with some information r ∈ R. Later, an authenticating tag s ∈ S is sent over the narrow-band channel. Figure 3 depicts this NIMAP. Note that V is public knowledge and a computationally unbounded adversary can find or store V ahead of time.
If |M| ≤ |S|, then there exists a trivial NIMAP where the whole message is transmitted over the authenticated channel. We assume that |M| > |S| to consider nontrivial NIMAPs. For every tag s ∈ S, we let M s be the set of all messages such that there exists some r in which (M, r, s) results in an acceptance by Bob. In other words, M s := {M : (M, r, s) ∈ V for some r}.
We let U be the set of all tags that can authenticate only one message; that is,
Furthermore, we let M U be the union of all M s such that s ∈ U. In other words,
Since |U | ≤ |S| < |M| and |U | = |M U |, we obtain that |M U | < |M|. Hence, there exists an
The attack consists of Eve choosing any M ∈ M \ M U and giving it to Alice. Note that Eve is computationally unbounded and can find such an M . Later, when Eve receives (M, r, s) from Alice, she replaces it with the appropriate (M ′ , r ′ , s), that we know exists. This attack, which succeeds with probability equal to 1, is depicted in Fig. 4 . The usual attack model allows Eve to select the message M that Alice will transmit to Bob. It is also interesting to consider a weaker attack model in which Alice chooses the message M ∈ M uniformly at random. We have the following new result. Theorem 2.3. Suppose we have a NIMAP where Alice chooses the message M ∈ M uniformly at random, and the message space M has greater cardinality than the tag space S. Then Eve can deceive Bob with probability at least 1 − |S|/|M|.
Proof. The analysis in this attack model is similar to the usual model. As before, Eve can successfully deceive Bob whenever M ∈ M \ M U . We showed above that |M U | ≤ |S|. Under the assumption that Alice chooses the message M ∈ M uniformly at random, it follows that
Therefore Eve can deceive Bob in this weaker attack model with probability at least 1−|S|/|M|.
An Unconditionally Secure 3-Round IMAP
Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15] proposed an unconditionally secure IMAP, with k rounds, using evaluation of polynomials over finite fields, for every integer k. To authenticate λ-bit message in k rounds, they require the length of the authenticated string to be about 2 log(1/ǫ) + 2 log (k−1) λ + O(1), where ǫ is the probability of success of the adversary. The length of the authenticated string over the narrow-band channel is 2 log(1/ǫ) + O(1) when k = log λ. When k = 3, the length is 2 log(1/ǫ) + 2 log log λ + O(1). (Note that all logarithms are to the base 2.) Moreover, they proved that their protocol is close to optimal by proving a lower bound of 2 log(1/ǫ) − 6 on the required length of the authenticated string, independent of the length of the message.
In this paper, we focus on unconditionally secure IMAPs with three rounds. These are probably the IMAPs of greatest practical interest, since the communication structure is as simple as possible.
We present a construction for 3-round IMAPs based on ǫ-∆ universal hash families. This IMAP includes the Naor-Segev-Smith 3-round IMAP as a special case. We give a security analysis of our construction and analyze how to minimize the deception probability by choosing the hash families carefully. It turns out that the best IMAPs produced by this approach use hash families based on Reed-Solomon codes (essentially, the approach of Naor-Segev-Smith) but with different, optimized parameters. If a ν-bit authentication tag is sent in the third round, then we can achieve a deception probability of 2 −ν/2+2 for most parameter situations of practical interest (more precisely, whenever the message to be authenticated is not too long; see Theorem 3.6).
Hash Family Preliminaries
We will make essential use of certain types of hash families. The notion of an ǫ-∆ universal hash family (also known as an ǫ-∆U hash family) was first given in Stinson [20] , generalizing the idea of ǫ-almost xor universal hash families due to Krawczyk [9] . In this section, we review some old results and prove some new results that will be used in the rest of the paper. We begin with the following definition for ǫ-∆U hash families. Definition 3.1. Suppose that a hash family H has keyspace K, and h K : X → Y for all k ∈ K. We assume that (Y, +) is an abelian group. The hash family H is an ǫ-∆U hash family if for all choices of M, M ′ ∈ X and all s ∈ Y, it holds that
where the probability is computed over a randomly chosen key k ∈ K. Equivalently,
We will denote the hash family H as an ǫ-∆U (N ; n, m) hash family if N = |K|, n = |X |, and m = |Y|.
We next present some bounds and constructions on ǫ-∆U hash families. 
Then a y ≤ ǫN for all y ∈ Y M,M ′ , so
On the other hand,
It therefore follows that N ≤ ǫN 2 , so ǫ ≥ 1/N . Proof. See [20, Theorem 4.3] .
We now present a class of hash families based on Reed-Solomon codes. These hash families were first described in [20, Theorem 4.8] . The IMAP of Naor, Segev and Smith [14, 15] makes essential use of these hash families.
Lemma 3.3.
[20] Suppose q is a prime power and 1 ≤ t ≤ q + 1. Define K = F q , X = (F q ) t and Y = F q . For any k ∈ K and any (x 1 , . . . , x t ) ∈ X , define
Then RS(q, t) = {h k : k ∈ K} is a t q -∆U (q; q t , q) hash family. Figure 5 illustrates our generalization of the protocol proposed by Naor et al. In our protocol, we use the following notation and assumptions:
The IMAP
1. Let M be the set of all possible messages, and denote M 0 = M.
2. We use two families of hash functions, H 1 and H 2 . For i = 1, 2, H i is an ǫ i -∆U (N i ; n i , m i ) hash family.
3. For i = 1, 2, let the keyspace of H i be denoted by K i . For every k i ∈ K i , the hash function
Reject, otherwise. There are two hash function computations performed in this protocol. First,
is sent over the authenticated channel. Observe that Alice and Bob both compute x 1 and x 2 during the protocol.
Possible Attacks Against a 3-round Protocol
Before we analyze the protocol presented in Figure 5 , we discuss the possible attacks we must consider. Let M be the set of all messages, and let x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and s ∈ S, for some sets X , Y, and S. Figure 6 depicts a 3-round generic IMAP (3GIMAP).
Gehrman [4] looked at different possible attacks against a generic k-round protocol and proved that there are in total k+1 k+1 2 distinct attacks. He used the following notation to label these attacks. A flow initiated by the adversary is labelled as A if it sent to Alice, and, similarly, a flow sent by the adversary is labelled as B if the recipient is Bob. According to his result, there are 4 2 = 6 possible attacks against a three round protocol, namely, AABB, ABBA, BABA, ABAB, BBAA, and BAAB attacks.
The last flow of 3GIMAP is an authenticated flow sent by Alice to Bob. According to the communication model of two-channel cryptography, the adversary can only replay this last flow. As a result, the only possible attacks against 3GIMAP are the ones that end with a flow sent to Bob, namely AABB, ABAB, and BAAB. These attacks are depicted in Figures 7, 8 , and 9. 
Analysis of the IMAP
Now we are in a position to analyze the attacks on the protocol presented in Figure 5 . In a successful attack, it is required that M A 0 = M B 0 and x 2 = x B 2 . We distinguish two cases: 
, and
which simplifies to
In case (ii), we have x 2 = x B 2 , and it follows that
where
. We now analyze each of the three attacks.
ABAB attack
Case (i) Here, M A 0 , M B 0 , s A 1 and s B 1 are fixed before k 1 is chosen by Bob. Therefore, the probability that (1) holds is at most ǫ 1 , because H 1 is an ǫ 1 -∆U hash family.
, s A 2 and s B 2 are fixed before k 2 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the probability that (2) holds is at most ǫ 2 , because H 2 is an ǫ 2 -∆U hash family. The probability of success of an ABAB attack is therefore at most ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 .
BAAB attack
Case (i) Here, k 1 , M A 0 , M B 0 and s B 1 are fixed before s A 1 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the probability that (1) holds is 1/|X 1 |.
, s A 2 and s B 2 are fixed before k 2 is chosen by Alice. Therefore, the probability that (2) holds is ǫ 2 .
The probability of success of a BAAB attack is therefore at most 1/|X 1 | + ǫ 2 .
AABB attack
Case (i) Eve has to choose k A 1 before Bob chooses k B 1 . The probability that
and s A 2 are fixed before s B 2 is chosen by Bob. Therefore, the probability that (2) holds is 1/|X 2 |.
The probability of success of an AABB attack is therefore at most 1/|K 1 | + 1/|X 2 |.
Summary
If we consider all three attacks, we see that Eve succeeds with probability
It follows from Lemma 3.1 that
Therefore, we have proven the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose there exists an ǫ i -∆U (N i ; n i , m i ) hash family, for i = 1, 2, where n 2 ≥ N 1 m 1 . Then the protocol presented in Figure 5 manually authenticates an log 2 n 1 -bit message with an (log 2 N 2 + log 2 m 2 )-bit tag, where the deception probability of an adversary is at most ǫ ≤ ǫ 1 + ǫ 2 .
Specific Constructions for Unconditionally Secure IMAPs
The following application of Theorem 3.4 uses the hash families constructed in Lemma 3.3. It is similar to the construction in [14, 15] , specialized to three rounds, but with more general parameters.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose that λ, µ and ν are positive integers such that λ > µ > ν/2. Then a λ-bit message can be manually authenticated with a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which
Proof. Define
The required hash families exist from Lemma 3.3 and it is easy to verify that n 2 ≥ 2 2ν = N 1 m 1 .
In our computations, it will be useful to note that we have the following in Corollary 3.5:
• M 0 is λ bits in length,
is µ bits in length,
is 2µ bits in length,
is ν/2 bits in length, and
The value of µ in Corollary 3.5 would be chosen to minimize the resulting value of ǫ. Denote t = ⌈ 4µ ν ⌉. Observe that µ > ν/2, so t > 2. We will assume that 2µ is an integer multiple of the integer value ν/2, and λ is an integer multiple of µ. It follows that 4µ/ν is an integer, so we have t = 4µ/ν. Writing µ = νt/4, we can express the bound (3) as follows:
For fixed λ and ν, denote the right side of (4) by f (t). Recalling that t is an integer, it is possible to determine the value of t that maximizes f (t) by computing
After some simplification, it can be verified that
. It follows that it is optimal to use t = 3 whenever
When t = 3, we have µ = 3ν/4. We want λ to be a multiple of µ, so we denote t 1 = λ/µ. Observing that 2 ν/2 2 ν/4 − 1 = 2 ν/4 , and using the fact that t 1 is an integer, we can refine (5) as follows: Table 1 lists the maximum value of λ such that t = 3 is optimal, for various values of ν, along with the corresponding values of µ, t 1 and log 2 ǫ. We have that t 1 = 2 ν/4 , µ = 3ν/4 and λ = νt 1 . Observe that log 2 ǫ = −ν/2 + 2; this can be verified algebraically using (4), since
It can be seen that the resulting λ values cover many if not most practical applications of IMAPs. Summarizing, we have the following. Theorem 3.6. Suppose λ ≤ 3ν 2 ν/4−2 . Then a λ-bit message can be manually authenticated with a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which ǫ ≤ 2 −ν/2+2 .
Remark:
The value of ν in Theorem 3.6 can be expressed as ν = 2 log(1/ǫ) + 4, which is only 10 bits more than the lower bound ν ≥ 2 log(1/ǫ) − 6 proven in [14, 15] .
Example 3.1. Suppose we wish to construct a 3-round IMAP with a 48-bit authenticated tag. Then we take ν = 48 in Theorem 3.6. The deception probability of the IMAP will be at most 2 −22 provided that the message to be authenticated is at most 147456 bits in length. The scheme has µ = 36, so the hash family H 2 is a 3/2 24 -∆U (2 24 ; 2 72 , 2 24 ) hash family. The hash family H 1 is an ǫ 1 -∆U (2 36 ; 2 λ , 2 36 ) hash family, where λ ≤ 147456 and ǫ 1 = λ 36 2 −36 ≤ 2 −24 . Implementation of the scheme requires evaluating a polynomial of degree λ/36 over the field F 2 36 , and a polynomial of degree 3 over the field F 2 24 . Example 3.2. We present an example of the Naor-Segev-Smith scheme. As in the previous example, we take λ = 147456 and ǫ = 2 −22 . We apply the formulas in [15, p. 2414] . Using our notation, we would obtain µ = ⌈2 + log 147456 + 22⌉ = 42 and ν = 2 ⌈1 + log 84 + 22⌉ = 60.
Thus their scheme uses a 60-bit tag whereas a 48-bit tag is sufficient in our scheme.
Another Unconditionally Secure 3-Round IMAP
as Figure 10 illustrates another unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP. This IMAP requires only one evaluation of a hash function instead of two. It is most useful in the authentication of relatively short messages. We use one hash function family, H, which is an ǫ-∆U (N ; n, m) hash family. Let the keyspace of H be denoted by K, and for every k ∈ K, there is a hash function h k : M → X . The number of bits sent over the authenticated channel is log |K| + log |X |. In a BAAB attack, Eve is required to set k A = k B , otherwise she will be detected. Eve is successful if and only if
In other words, Eve succeeds if and only if s A = h k B (M B ) + s B − h k B (M A ). In the BAAB attack, s A is randomly chosen by Alice after k B is chosen by Bob, so Eve succeeds with probability 1/|X |. Note that s B − s A is a predetermined fixed value. Hence, since H is an ǫ-∆U hash family, Eve succeeds with probability at most ǫ.
If we summarize the above three attacks, we see that Eve succeeds with probability max{ǫ, |X | −1 , |K| −1 }.
From Lemma 3.1, we have max{ǫ, |X | −1 , |K| −1 } = ǫ. Therefore we have the following.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there exists an ǫ-∆U (N ; n, m) hash family. Then the protocol presented in Figure 10 manually authenticates an log 2 n-bit message with an (log 2 N + log 2 m)-bit tag, where the deception probability of an adversary is at most ǫ.
Using the hash families constructed in Lemma 3.3, we have the following theorem, which is a corollary of Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose λ ≤ ν(2 ν/2−1 ). Then a λ-bit message can be manually authenticated with a ν-bit tag using a 3-round IMAP in which the deception probability ǫ ≤ λ/(ν2 ν/2−1 ).
Proof. Let q = 2 ν/2 and t = 2λ/ν. Since λ ≤ ν(2 ν/2−1 ), we have that t ≤ 2 × ν(2 ν/2−1 )/ν = q. Therefore, Lemma 3.3 establishes the existence of an ǫ-∆U (q; q t , q) hash family, where ǫ = t/q. Now apply Theorem 4.1. The resulting IMAP authenticates a message of length log q t = t log q = (2λ/ν) × (ν/2) = λ with a tag of length 2 log q = ν. The deception probability is ǫ = t/q = t/2 ν/2 = (2λ/ν)/2 ν/2 = λ/(ν2 ν/2−1 ).
If we wish to have ǫ = 2 −ν/2+2 , as in Theorem 3.6, then we must take λ ≤ 4ν in Corollary 4.2. For this range of values of λ, however, we achieve the same security as Theorem 3.6 but we require only one hash function computation.
Conclusion

